Missouri University of Science and Technology

Scholars' Mine
International Conference on Case Histories in
Geotechnical Engineering

(1993) - Third International Conference on Case
Histories in Geotechnical Engineering

03 Jun 1993, 10:30 am - 12:30 pm

Failure of a Twenty-Foot High Retaining Wall
R. E. Olson
University of Texas, Austin, Texas

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge
Part of the Geotechnical Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Olson, R. E., "Failure of a Twenty-Foot High Retaining Wall" (1993). International Conference on Case
Histories in Geotechnical Engineering. 15.
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge/3icchge/3icchge-session05/15

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering by an authorized
administrator of Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including
reproduction for redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please
contact scholarsmine@mst.edu.

Proceedings: Third International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering, St. Louis, Missouri,
June 1-4, 1993, Paper No. 5.31

Failure of a Twenty-Foot High Retaining Wall
R. E. Olson
L. P. Gilvin Professor of Civil Engineering, University of Texas,
Austin, Texas

SYNOPSIS A cantilever retaining wall, designed in apparent accord with provisions in a civil engineering handbook,
failed soon after construction. Analyses of the causes of the failure are presented.
Table 1
INTRODUCTION

Subsoil
clay
clay
clay
sand
unknown
sand

Cantilever retaining walls are typically designed using
either the Rankine or Coulomb equations to estimate
applied forces and considering failure modes involving
sliding, overturning, toe failures, and overall failure. The
standard design techniques are in civil engineering
handbooks and have been in use for decades. Designers
would seem to have the right to expect that a wall designed
in accord with handbooks would perform adequately well.
A cantilever retaining wall with a maximum height
exceeding twenty-six feet (eight metres) was designed by a
registered professional engineer, in accord with a standard
handbook. The designer was a generalist who performed
design work in most areas of civil engineering and was thus
not trained specially in geotechnical engineering. The
designer used factors of safety in excess of two against the
usual failure modes. The wall collapsed and subsequent
litigation led to losses in excess of $1 million for the
designer.

Backfill
clay
sand
unknown
clay
unknown
sand

% of Walls
43
17
8
8
24
0

DEVELOPMENT OF SITE
A developer selected a site in Central Texas for a shopping
center. The site fronted on a major street and was
generally flat until near the back edge and left side where
the surface began to slope downwards into a large tract of
land that was left wild and used as a nature preserve. The
ground in the preserve sloped down at about 15 to 20
degrees.
Economic considerations dictated a certain floor area
for the shopping center, and city ordinances then required a
certain area for parking spaces and driveways. It was
discovered that it would be necessary to provide parking
and driveways to a line near the edges of the property and
thus that it would be necessary to use a 1300-foot (400-m)
long retaining wall along the left side and the rear, to
support fill. The maximum height of the actual wall,
measured from the top of the stem to the bottom of the
keyway, was 26 feet 9 inches (8.2 m).

The purpose of this paper is to present the case history,
examine the original design calculations, present a more
appropriate, but still simple, set of analyses, and draw
relevant conclusions.
CASE IDSTORIES OF RETAINING WALL FAILURES
Anecdotal evidence of unacceptable performance of
retaining walls, can be heard but well-defined case histories
seem to be few. Ireland (1964) made a survey of walls
used to support railway cuts. He categorized the backfill
and subsoil simply as "sand" (including gravel) and "clay".
The distribution of data for walls that had not performed
properly are shown in Table 1.

City environmentalists objected to the presence of a high
concrete wall at the upper edge of the nature preserve so a
solution was worked out such that there would be a
relatively low single wall over much of the length and a
double wall (Fig. 1) over a 700-foot (210-m) section where
the wall was higher than about fifteen feet (4.6 m).
Vegetation below the lower wall would obscure that wall
from view from below, and vegetation in the flat area

These cases confirm the general view that the major
problems are associated with cohesive soils.
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Summary of Cases of Retaining Walls
Engaging in Unacceptable Behavior
(Ireland, 1964)
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DESIGN OF THE WALL

vegetation

In view of the fact that subsurface materials were generally
limestone or stiff to hard clay shale, that there was an
interest in getting the project in operation quickly, and the
wall may have been a late addition to the design, the
designer apparently saw little need to perform expensive
soil tests.
The designer attempted to follow
recommendations in the Standard Handbook for Civil
Engineers (Merritt, 1983), literally tracking through each
successive calculation using the same symbols as in the
The designer selected an apparently
handbook.
conservative active earth pressure coefficient of 0.4 (cp-25
degrees) and a total unit weight of 100 pcf for the backfill.

16'-0"

location
uncertain

Fig. 1

Wall Configuration in the Area of the Failure

The factor of safety against overturning was calculated
as the ratio of the potential resisting moment to the
apparent overturning moment, about the toe. The designer
analyzed the two wall sections separately and ignored the
effect of the upper wall on the lower one. The calculated
factor of safety of the lower wall was 2.4.

between the walls and above the top wall would obscure the
upper wall and shopping center. An irrigation system was
planned at the top and at the mid-height.

For the sliding mode of failure, a wall-surface friction
coefficient of 0.62 was used (o-32 deg.), and the factors of
safety defined using forces, were inexplicably around 1.0.

SITE INVESTIGATION AT DESIGN TIME
The designer estimated the toe stress by taking moments
about the heel. In consideration of the presence of
limestone and clay shale, the designer set a limit on the
calculated toe stress of 5000 psf (240 kPa) based on an
undefined handbook and a description of the soil as "clay
shale". The actual calculated toe stress was 4.3 ksf (206
kPa).

About thirty soil borings were made at the site as part of
several engineering studies. However, discussion in the
engineering reports was restricted to the buildings and to
pavements. The wall may not have been contemplated
during the main design time. The boring closest to the wall
was one-hundred feet (30m) away. Over much of the site
there was one to four feet (1 to 1.2 m) of rocky clay on top
of limestone. Several borings penetrated the limestone and
encountered a layer of clay shale at a depth of fifteen to
twenty feet (4.5 to 6 m). The limestone layer was missing
over part of the site, with the clay shale exposed. The clay
shale was also exposed in the slope behind the structure and
that slope was probably at the angle of repose. No water
table was encountered in any soil boring.

No slope stability type analyses were performed tc
examine the possibility of an overall failure.
The designer specified that 2-inch (50-mm) diamete1
PVC drainage tubes be cast into both the upper and lowe1
walls, near the base of their stems, on 20-foot (6-m:
centers. A one-cubic foot (0.03 cu.m.) bag of clean 3/4·
inch (18-mm) gravel was to be placed on the soil side o:
each drainage hole to provide filtration.

The boring closest to the wall showed a soil profile of
four feet (1.2 m) of clay over limestone with the limestone
described as weathered near its surface but very hard at a
depth of six feet (1.8 m).

No specifications were provided for the backfill but i
was believed that local practice, and city specifications we~
followed. The city specifications set no limit on th~
maximum particle size but specified that "The percentage o
fines shall be sufficient to fill all voids and insure a uniforn
and thor?ughly compacted mass of proper density"
ConstructiOn records show that several density tests wer
performed. The backfill apparently ranged from tar.
weathered, limestone gravel, to a brown gravelly cla)
Field density tests indicated 95% to 100% of standar
Proctor compaction.

In accord with usual practice, most of the soil tests were
of the classification type. Atterberg limit tests indicated
that most the the cohesive soil had liquid limits in the range
of 30 to 50% and plasticity points plotted above the- A line.
Unconfined compressive strengths of shallow clays were
generally 1 to 3 tsf (100-300 kPa), with strengths up to 7
tsf (700 kPa) at greater depths in fissured clay shale.
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with a diameter about the size of a pencil. Apparently, the
back side of the weep hole was blocked except for one small
hole, and there must have been a substantial water head
behind the wall.

BEHAVIOR OF THEWALL
Construction History
Construction records were not entirely available but it is
known that backfilling of the wall occurred during April
and it is believed that the wall was completely backfilled in
May.

Examination of intact portions of the wall showed the
presence of rust stains along vertical joints, to a height of
about six feet (two metres) above toe slab of the lower wall.
POST-FAILURE SOILS INVESTIGATION

Wall Failure

Post failure site access was difficult because of the debris.
w.e made two borings, using a light, portable rig, about
thtrty feet outside the original position of the lower wall
and one in the fill just behind the scarp.

In late July, after a period of heavy rain, a section of the
lower rear wall, with. a length of about 135 feet (41 m),
~uddenl.Y began to dtsplace horizontally. My first site
mspectton was about seven hours after the failure
apparently began and, at that point, the lower wall had
displace~ horiz?ntally about fifteen feet (5 m) (Fig. 2). A
substantial verttcal scarp had formed in the fill because the
upper wall had dropped into the void formed when the
lower wall displaced. The lower wall continued to displace
horizontally at a slow rate. Some months later, when the
wall approached the property line, the damaged portion of
the wall was removed.

One boring in front of the wall encountered four feet
(1.2 m) of medium to stiff black clay, grading rocky near
the bottom, and met refusal at four feet (1.2 m), probably
due to limestone. The other boring encountered four feet
(1.2 m) of soft, wet, rocky clay (probably fill), over three
feet (1.0 m) of tan clay (LL=54%, Pl=33%, w=31 %), and
then refusal. The third boring was in the fill ·that had not
yet failed. It encountered four feet (1.2 m) of pavement,
base, and a rocky clay; two feet (0.6 m) of dry granular
fill; 3.5 feet 1.1 m) of soft, wet, gravelly clay (LL=30%,
Pl=13%, w=22%); one foot (0.3 m) of very soft tan clay;
five feet (1.5 m) of very soft, wet, gravelly clay (LL=28%,
Pl=ll %, w=35%), two feet (0.6 m) of medium tan clay,
and four feet (1.2 m) of dry, medium to stiff, black clay.
~is boring confirmed the heterogeneous nature of the fill.
The fact that an essentially vertical scarp, with a height
of about six feet (2 m), stood for some days after the
failure, seemed to indicate that the fill was reasonably well
compacted.

Fig. 2

Because of the heterogeneous nature of the fill, we did
not perform any shearing tests on fill material. We
performed four drained direct shear tests on samples of
natural clay taken from a depth of four to six feet (1.2-2.0
m) in one of the borings in front of the wall (Fig. 3).

View of the Failed Section of Wall

Site Observations

·~ 7r---------~----------~------~~

A.
~ sr--,---T~~--~r-----~~~----~

The exposed fill was mostly limestone gravel but there
were several layers of clay. Water was leaking out of the
most pervious layers in the ftll.

~ s~~====~i=~~--~~--~~~~

Vegetation in front of the lower wall was dry and dead
but vegetation that had been between or above the walls was
green. The soil directly in front of the wall, and the
slumped fill, was soft. Broken irrigation pipes could be
seen in the fill between and above the walls.

4

t-----rt-:7f=-::7..__t--tliii.:--i

·~

3

t----::Pf--~~~---1

~ 2~--~~~~~-+~~~~L-----~
Cl)

Based on the lack of stains, many of the weep holes had
apparently not functioned. Attempts to drive rods through
them often failed. It appeared that the fill side of some of
the holes was blocked with concrete. Water was spurting
out of the top part of one of the weep holes, in a stream
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Fig. 3
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Results of Direct Shear Tests on Natural
Clay Shale

15

The "residual" friction angle was estimated simply by
trimming a smooth failure surface in a direct shear sample
and shearing the sample back and forth several times on
that surface. Only the final stress path curves are shown in
Fig. 3.
The estimated value of c was 100 psf (4.8 kPa) for peak
and residual, but. was about 25 deg. for peak and 16 deg.
for residual conditions (Fig. 3). The measured shearing
properties agreed well with a number of other sheari~g
tests performed in our laboratory on samples from thts
formation, or from other similar formations in the area,
except that the peak friction angle for the other tests was
usually closer to 21 deg. and the residual friction angle
generally was in the range of 12 to 15 degrees.
ANALYSIS OF STABILITY

I

The estimated wall configuration in the area of the failure
is shown in Fig. 1. The location of the contact between fill
and natural soil is uncertain. The actual location of the
bottom of the lower wall is unknown because design
drawings indicated that the elevation of that base slab would
be decided in the field. It is probable that the slab in the
middle part of the failed zone was on natural soil because
that was the apparent intent of the specifications, but it may
also have been on fill.

Fig. 4

The uncertainties in wall geometries and soil conditions
are such that a sophisticated analysis is not warranted.
Instead, the analysis is of the type that a practicing engineer
might have made during the design phase. The purpose of
the analysis is to determine if a relatively routine approach,
properly applied, would have predicted failure.

p

The analysis was performed in two phases. In the first,
the upper wall and soil below it (Fig. 4) were taken out as a
free body. Equations for force equilibrium in the vertical
and horizontal direction make it possible to calculate the
force P that this upper wall and associated soil applies to the
vertical plane through the heel of the lower wall. The
orientation of the potential shear surface (9 in Fig. 4) was
obtained by trial. Because of the tedious nature of the
computations, a computer program was written that
allowed the user to vary the parameters (~, c, ~. Hw, q, o,
"(, and W) as required.

Fig. 5

Assumed Conditions for the Lower Wall

Analyses to Obtain P
Assume the soil is saturated and undrained. Practicin
engineers often assume that clays are saturated an
undrained because then they can assume that <1>=0 and th
analysis is greatly simplified. The presence of gravellayex
in the backfill, with water flowing through them, makes :
clear that this condition could not have existed throughot
the backfill. However, the designer performed som
computations based on this assumption so it will be use
here as one extreme case. In any case, the wall did stan
for some period of time and that stability needs to b
explained.

In the second phase, the force P was applied to a free
body composed of the lower wall and soil above its heel
slab (Fig. 5) and factors of safety were calculated for
various failure modes.
The analysis was of the Coulomb type and thus moment
equilibrium was not satisfied. However, for active
conditions, the Coulomb analysis seems to yield forces that
are comparable to those calculated using more sophisticated
approaches (Morgenstern and Eisenstein, 1970). The
location of P and its obliquity were unknown. Trial
analyses were performed to estimate the importance of
these uncertainties.
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Assumed Wedge of Soil Sliding Toward the
Lower Wall

Analyses using 0=0 (Fig. 4) indicated that P droppe,
from 39 kips/foot when c=lOO psf (4.8 kPa), to 0 whe:
c=720 psf (34 kPa). Measured undrained strengths were i.J
excess of 720 psf (34 kPa) for the natural soils an,
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estimated undrained strengths for the exposed clay layers in
the backfill also exceeded 720 psf (34 kPa). The analysis
confirms the field observation that a substantial height of
the clayey part of the fill would stand unsupported as long
as it was undrained. The assumption of no drainage could
not apply to the fill prior to failure, because of the gravel
layers, but it may be relevant for the cohesive parts of the
backfill immediately after failure.
Assume the soil is fully drained. Because of the
variation in fill material both vertically and horizontally, it
seemed most reasonable to assume a homogeneous fill but
do a sensitivity analysis for a reasonable range in
properties. The cohesionless layers probably had friction
angles of at least 35 degrees, and no cohesion. The clay
layers probably had friction angles close to that of the
natural soil, 25 degrees, with no cohesion. The results of
part of the sensitivity study are shown in Table 2.

given by:
pf = cNcdcicgc + yDfNqdqiqgq + 0.5B'yN-ydyiygy

where N is a dimensionless bearing capacity factor (depends
on lj> ), d, i, and g are dimensionless factors to account for
footing depth, inclined load, and effects of local ground
slope, c is soil cohesion, y is the soil unit weight above
footing depth (q term) or below footing depth (y term).
The bearing capacity, pf, is the vertical component of the
applied force, divided by footing width. A variety of
equations have been proposed for the various factors.
Equations used here were as follows:
Nc

Table 2-Sensitivity Study for the Upper Wall

c
psf

lj>
psf
25

100

25

Hw
ft
0
10
0

0

25

0

100

0

p

de g.
0

kips/foot
12
14
12

0
15
0

100
200
300
0

15
20
25
30

0

0

(1)

=(Nq-1)cot(lj>)

Nq = exp(1t tan lj>) tan2(45+!)

(Reissner, 1924)

(3)

Ny= (Nq-l)tan(1.41j>)

(Meyerhof, 1961)

(4)

D
dq = 1 + O.lB

(Hansen, 1970)

(5)

(deBeer, 1970)

(6)

de=

11

(Prandtl, 1920_, 1921) (2)

dqsqNg-1
Nq-1

(7)

15
12
8
4

dy= 1

sq = 1+[:(tan ~!>triaxial)

(deBeer, 1970)

(8)

23

ic=iq=(l-~)2

(Meyerhof, 1953)

(9)

B

19
15

where a. is the inclination of the resultant force on the base
relative to a line normal to the plane of the base,

12

iy = (1 - ~)2

The effect of depth of water (Hw) and obliquity of the
resulting earth force (o) are minor compared with the
effects of mean c and lj>. It would appear that a reasonably
conservative design would use about 15 kips/foot for P.

gc

(10)

(Hansen, 1970)

(11)

where ~ is the slope of the ground surface measured
positively downwards from the horizontal (degrees)

Local Stability of the Lower Wall
Stability of the lower wall (Fig. 5) was analyzed for
overturning, sliding, and bearing capacity. Equations for
overturning and sliding are found in most books on
foundation engineering and need not be repeated.
Some engineers, including the designer of this wall, ~o
not calculate bearing capacity l;>ut rather calculate the tlp
stress assuming a linear variation in contact stress across the
base. Such a computation makes little sense fo~ a surf~ce
footing on a cohesionless subsoil because the tl~ be~nng
capacity depends on footing width and has the _mat10~al
value of zero for an imaginary strip footing of differential
width at the toe.
The more rational approach is to
calculate the bearing capacity of the base slab. The bearing
capacity of a strip footing subjected to an inclined ~d
eccentric load, and located on a sloping ground surface, 1s
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=(1 - 1~7)

(Meyerhof, 1953)

gq = gy = [1 - 0.5 tan(~)]5

(Hansen, 1970)

(12)

B' = B-2e

(Meyerhof, 1953)

(13)

and e is the eccentricity of the resultant force applied to the
subsoil by the base.
Analyses were performed to determine the factors of
safety against failure of the lower wall. A sensitivity study
was again performed because of the uncertainties in the
various input variables. The results of a part of those
computations are shown in Table 3. For all analyses, it
was assumed that there was 1.3 feet (0.4 m) of soil
producing passive resistance at the toe.
795

limited by the uncertainties in soil properties once the clay
shale became relatively hard. If the clay shale was assumed
to possess a large effective cohesion at shallow depth, then
the slope stability analysis gave factors of safety comparable
to those obtained for bearing capacity and sliding.

Table 3 Sensitivity Study for the Lower Wall

p

H
p
ft

op
de
g.

0
B
de

aB
ps
f

de
g.

5

0

25

0

25

10
0

3
5
6

0

25

0

25

10
0

15

5

25

0

25

15

5

0
15
0

0

15

5

0

30
25
25

30
25
25

15

5

0

0

10
00

10
0
10
0
10
0
0
10

kp
f
15
13
11
15

0

~

0

c
ps
f

Fsbc

Fso

Fss

0.08
0.19
0.31
0.49
0.08
0.00
0.08
0.33
0.12
0.08
0.08
0.03

1.13
1.31
1.89
1.31

0.47
0.55
0.65
0.47
0.47

1.13
2.35
1.13
1.13
1.13
1.13

0.47
0.61
0.58
0.47
0.47
0.46

0.16

1.13

0.76

1.55

CAUSES OF THE INADEQUATE DESIGN
The designer's computations were examined as part of the
discovery phase prior to trial. In general, the main source
of the problem was that the designer based the design on a
standard engineering handbook without understanding the
limitations of such an approach. On a more technical level:
1. the designer followed the common, but irrational,
practice of limiting the apparent tip stress rather than
estimating the bearing capacity of the base slab. The
bearing capacity equations for cases involving inclined
and eccentric load, and for footings on a slope, have a
substantial degree of uncertainty in them but at least they
provide a rational form of analysis.
2. the designer apparently did not understand the
difference between the strengths of the soil under
drained and undrained conditions.
3. for reasons that were never explained, the designer
ignored the effect of the upper wall on the loads applied
to the lower wall.

-.-- -.--

00

The first group of three analyses with variable force P
shows that the lower wall was unstable in bearing capacity
and sliding modes for any reasonable forces that would be
predicted from the previous analyses.
The second set of analyses show that even a small
increase in the assumed height of application of force would
result in a bearing capacity failure because of the resulting
eccentricity of resultant force on the base.

WHY DID THE WALL STAND UP AT ALL?
Based on the low calculated factors of safety, one wonders
why the wall stood up at all. Some of the reasons include:
1. The maximum height of wall existed over a length of
only about one-hundred feet (30 m). Stability increases
rapidly as the wall height decreases so only a small
portion of the wall was in danger. The unstable sectio11
of the wall probably derived limited amounts of suppor1
from adjacent stable portions.
2. Subsoil conditions were uncertain. Some of the wall
may have been supported by a thin layer of limestone
that was above the clay shale.
3. The clay shale became considerably harder with deptl:
(could not be penetrated with thin-walled steel tubes'
and may have been cemented, thus causing the factor o;
safety for bearing capacity to be higher than predicted.
4. Negative pore. water pressures in the backfill durin!!
much of xts hfe would have reduced applied force!
greatly, perhaps essentially to zero. The rains tha
immediately preceded the failure apparently raised the
pore water pressures in the fill and caused increase(
earth forces.
5. The drainage system, though widely used, wa1
ineffective and large water pressures apparently built UJ
on the wall after the rain. Because of the irregula
nature of the fill, the water pressure was probably no
hydrostatic but, instead, developed in the more perviou:
layers of fill.

The third set of analyses shows that increasing the
assumed obliquity of the applied force (positive for a
downwards vertical component) results in an increase in the
factors of safety, mostly because the horizontal component
of the force is then reduced.
The fourth set of analyses shows that increasing the
friction angles in the reasonable range had only a small
numerical influence on the factors of safety.
Similarly, the sixth set of analyses showed that changing
the cohesion, through a reasonable range, also had a small
effect on the factors of safety.
The fmal analysis was for the undrained case and used
the smallest measured strengths. In that case the wall was
unstable for bearing capacity. The largest measured
strengths were required to bring the bearing capacity factor
of safety up to 1.0. These analyses utilized the value of P
corresponding to a drained condition of the backfill.
Previous analyses showed that under undrained condition
there would be essentially no applied force and the wall
would then clearly be stable.
Overall Stability
Overall stability analyses were performed using a slope
stability program but the value of those analyses was
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CONCLUSIONS (RE)LEARNED

Meyerhof,. G. G. (1953), "The Bearing Capacity of
FoundatiOns Under Eccentric and Inclined Loads "
Proceedings, Third International Conference on Soil
Mechanics and Foundation Engineering, Zurich, Vol. 1,
pp. 440-445.

This case history demonstrates lessons that are generally
taught in college but seem often forgotten in practice,
including:
1. Engineers should not practice outside of their areas of
training and experience.
2. Engineers must resist pressure from clients who want
designs turned out immediately because of economic
considerations. A careless design, made in haste, may
cost the engineer dearly.
3. Design recommendations made in standard civil
engineering handbooks, for geotechnical problems, often
over simplify the problems and do not provide the kind
of technical advice that is required for successful design.
4. Designers should consider both short term (undrained)
and long term (drained) conditions unless a technical
understanding of the problem makes it clear that one or
the other is the critical case.
5. Positive means of controlling water pressures on walls is
critical.

Meyerhof, G. G. (1961), discussion, Proc., Fifth futern.
Conf. on Soil Mech. and Found. Engr. Vol 3 pp 193194.
'
. ' .
Morgenstern, N. R. and Z. Eisenstein (1970), "Methods of
Estimating Lateral Loads and Deformations", Proc.,
ASCE Specialty Conf. on Lateral Stresses and EarthRetaining Structures, Cornell Univ., pp. 51-102
Prandtl, L. (1920), "Uber die Harte platischer Korper",
Nach. Gesell. Wiss. Gottingen. Math-Phys. Kl. p. 74-85.
Prandtl, L. (1921 ), "Uber die Eindringungsfestigkeit
(Harte) Plastischer Baustoffe und deren Festigkeit von
Schneiden", Zeitschrift fur Angewandte Mathematik und
Mechanik.

LIST OF VARIABLES
aB
c
Fsbc
Fso
Fss
Hp
Hw
P
8

Op
OB

Reissner, H. (1924), "Zum Erddruckproblem", Proc., First
Intern. Congress of Applied Mechanics, Delft, pp. 295311.

adhesion of base slab on subsoil
cohesion
factor of safety against a bearing capacity failure
factor of safety against an overturning failure
factor of safety against a sliding failure
vertical distance from the heel to the point of
application of the earth force
height of ponded water
force applied to the vertical plane through the heel of
the lower wall (force/length)
obliquity of resultant force P (degrees)
obliquity of P on the vertical plane through the heel
(degrees)
obliquity of resultant force applied to the subsoil by
the base of the lower wall (degrees)
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